Turkey builds up its foreign policy taking into account different reserves, considering that it is unable to use certain resources at this moment, but in future they could be activated. Iran is conducting a similar policy but unlike Iran Turkey has bigger possibilities to plan strategic tasks since it is a NATO member and has a lot of opportunities to maneuver.
Turkey is not quite able to conduct an active policy in the South Caucasus, and especially in Central Asia, since it is bound tightly to the issues of the Near East where a deep and vast political “swamp” has been made made for it and Turkey itself stepped into it willingly. In the Caucasus-Caspian area Turkey’s main foreign reserve is Azerbaijan which it always considered as a serious help in carrying out its tasks.
The “Azerbaijani reserve” is used by Turkey not only for the solution of regional issues. The relations with Azerbaijan are used for the solution of a number of issues with the United States. The Americans are annoyed with this fact, let alone other major states, but Turkey, understanding this, goes on pedaling the “Azerbaijani factor”.
At the same time, Azerbaijan feels at ease in the role of “reserve” even in the framework of the policy of its primary partner. This “reserve” policy holds Azerbaijan back from crazy decisions, though, at the same time, close cooperation to organize a massive war is underway. Azerbaijan has already understood this but it has no way out but to follow Turkey’s interests not only in terms of strategy but also current political issues.
It is clear that the Western community (exactly the community) has skillfully and without effort involved Turkey in a nightmare called “Arab revolution”. It soon became clear that Turkey would not be able to carry out an operational policy in two or more directions at once since it just does not have the appropriate resources. However, the scenario of the Middle East is becoming all the more uncertain which could lead to a new stage of disorganization of relations between Turkey and the West.
Under these conditions, Ankara may be given a signal to a military conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia to impart Turkey with renewed significance in the region and the international arena. Turkish generals understood that it is hardly realistic to raise combat readiness of the Azerbaijani army to the desired level since it will take another decade. Thus, Turkey does not link the resumption of war between Azerbaijan and Armenia to the level of the Azerbaijani army.
In this case, not the outcome of the military actions is important but the political and geopolitical results of the military conflict in which Turkey will try to play the role of the conductor hoping to boost its influence.