While in the United States, I heard noted Republicans, who did not remain as committed to the Republicans as they hated Democrats, say the following: “There is no need to be tempted by H. Clinton’s popularity and the massive psychosis of Republicans.” When D. Trump wins, and one learns what team backs him just before that, you will see how worthless the Republican renegades and all kinds of Democrats are compared to the experts and functionaries of D. Trump’s team. However, what matters more is whom D. Trump can take to his administration. Most military, politicians, financiers and experts preferred staying in the shade and left their “homes” only on the wave of “white provincial nationalism”. We have met and talked to the majority of these people at different times and their intentions were fully clear. Several hundreds of well-tried Republicans preferred supporting Democrat H. Clinton, which indicated personal motives and a bid on interventionism, i.e. international politics which was conducted with delay every time America lost the next region. One was reluctant to wait for another four or eight months, one was reluctant to wait while Democrats were offering an active foreign policy. Republican Conservatives, being radicals in the sense of American traditions, always offered not just an active foreign policy but return of a great foreign policy, i.e. build-up on the principles of globalism, blocking economic and political opportunities of leading competitors which blossomed at the expense of the American market and American technologies, including in the defense sphere. There is a subtle illusion called interventionism in the U.S. The foreign policy of B. Obama and “classic” democrats was the retreat of the United States in many directions. A lot has been said about the need to develop NATO but, in fact, none of the four NATO summits were crucial to the development of Atlantic defense. In fact, Barack Obama did not try hard to force its partners into making additional expenses but nothing else in the U.S. policy could hit the country’s reputation and the faithfulness of allies as strongly as curtailing of military spending and, most probably, reduction of the army resources. The so-called isolationism in the U.S. policy was perceived in the world in a way that was different from what the current Republicans claimed. Isolationism was perceived as shrunk opportunities and intentions in the U.S. foreign policy. In reality, isolationism meant reduction of market relations for countries which grow reach and develop their technologies at the expense of the American opportunities. To a certain extent, isolation meant reduced efforts of the Americans in the sphere of defense, primarily of European allies whom the Americans most often call partners. In reality, the Conservative republicans foresaw strengthening of the U.S. defense capacity and at the same time NATO’s defense capabilities and all kinds of declarative theses regarding NATO liquidation supposed a transformation of the global defense and security system led by the United States. It is impossible that 200 generals and admirals supporting D. Trump concluded that NATO is an obsolete instrument. It is not clear why the urge for strengthening NATO is believed to be an indicator of the U.S. decline and decline of the policy of globalism. Russia is one of the doubtful questions in D. Trump’s electoral propaganda. M. Rogov, the director of the Institute on the United States and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences, thinks that they are trying to create a distance between China and Russia and prevent the creation of a strong Russian-Chinese alliance. However, this is a Russian point of view. One who has ever visited the United States and Canada Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences could have noticed that this institute no longer exists, and the Russian political science has been left without such a think tank. It should be noted that there has never been an alliance between Russia and China, especially a military one. Their relations are a sinusoid based on certain conjuncture needs of political tasks. China is interested in the United States more than in backward and impoverished Russia. The point is that the political relations with Russia and Iran turned out to be more weighted in the U.S. foreign policy. Or, if in regard to Iran the United States preferred developing relations, in regard to Russia the Americans launched its large-scale blocking and suffocation, which led to success. It was necessary to thwart these two tendencies, which D. Trump’s advisors did. Now, after the victory no country, not among partners and rivals of the United States, can figure out the logical intentions of the new president. Confusion is in the air, and hardly anyone can identify their policy based on the new assumptions in the U.S. policy. Most importantly, D. Trump and his team are confused too. And the statements that the process of forming a new administration is normal and successful are not quite true. Competitive, sometimes adversarial actions are underway among the main contenders for positions in the administration. On the other hand, the Republican retrogrades have removed from focus such a quantity of experienced administrators that there is nobody to appoint to 2000 positions in the new administration, and one will have to wait long to appoint to administration, especially regionalists. It is known that “realists” were strong in global politics, and they lacked the experience and wish to conduct a regional policy. The non-conservatives bid on the regions and hardly ever dealt with globalism. It seems that “realists” and neoconservatives should be united in D. Trump’s administration but apparently non-typical ones. At any rate, this will be a difficult task. It is possible that competitive processes may occur in the future administration when it will be impossible or quite difficult to unite different groups. One should understand that an ambitious yet inexperienced politician is the head of the United States, and people who are expected to form the administration are not authorities in the U.S. political circles. Besides, several politicians who supported D. Trump from the very beginning did not get positions, such as John Bolton whose appointment would be a tough illustration of ambitious and aggression in foreign policy. Meanwhile, there have been a lot of such people who have not been appointed, which does not lead to a correct understanding of the new president’s approach to personnel. Most probably, there is confusion and inability to unite politicians and specialists. It should be noted that D. Trump was supported by not only the white collars despite what the Democrats and leading Americans media claimed. He was supported by representatives of the middle class, though most of them are white collars, of course. Little is said about the middle class of second or third generations of recent immigrants, primarily Latin Americans who have become quite respectable Americans. This indicates that these layers of the society are not indifferent to the intentions of the new government in foreign policy. This is hardly a priority task but is quite important. Therefore, it would be wrong to describe D. Trump’s electorate as indifferent to foreign policy. It turns out that D. Trumps is German, and obviously the Americans of German descent supported him, therefore the Democrat state of Pennsylvania voted for the new president. And 39 million Americans of German origin are interested in raising Germany’s role in the U.S. foreign policy, primarily in the European policy and the role of NATO. The other ethnic component of the elections is the interests of the European community. Not a long time ago the leaders of Jewish organizations in the United States told me “we lost twice – in Syria and Iran”. However, Syria will wait whereas the positions had to be reviewed in the case of Iran. The majority of the Jewish community in the United States voted for H. Clinton but the elite of the community were able to detect interest with D. Trump or rather with people from his team. In addition, this took place earlier than he had spoken about his main theses. Hence, the idea about ending the agreements with Iran occurred. The majority of Armenians voted for D. Trump. However, I will not comment on the reasons. Let the Armenian political scientists speak about it who count zillions. Let us wait until the new Administration undertakes new successful or less successful steps. The important thing about Armenians, Georgians or Ukrainians will be how the United States will continue to support the policy of support to new independent states in Europe and in the territory of the USSR. However, this is a different topic, and we need to wait. Anyway, what is D. Trump thinking about now or rather what do his friends advise him? The important “analogue” of his victory – Brexit – remained as a pink dream, and the British people do not know yet how to leave the European community. Similarly NATO will remain a global and irreplaceable organization of defense and security, and the Anglo-Saxons will remain at the head of the alliance with a new role of Germany.
What's Donald Trump Going to Do?
- Comments - 29 November 2016, 00:03