Warlick Told Bitter Truth

    • Comments - 26 October 2016, 00:49
The April war took many lives but none of the sides should blame the other, the American co-chair of the Minsk Group James Warlick announced on October 25 in Yerevan when the Armenian journalists asked him that the co-chairs have not condemned the Azerbaijani aggression in April yet.

It is clear to everyone that Azerbaijan started the April war. Of course, the Armenian side wants the Azerbaijani aggression to be condemned duly, to have everyone express a clear stance on Azerbaijan’s step.

On the other hand, however, beyond fairness and morality, one has to be aware that as a country and a society we are dealing with a multi-layer and complicated system of international politics and we have to be adequate to it.

In this sense, it is notable to the world that the Armenian journalists may ask the Minsk Group co-chairs such questions and they never ask different Russian officials visiting Armenia any questions that contain badly disguised claims to condemn the Azerbaijani aggression.

As long as the Armenian society has not put forth its questions to the country which is considered its strategic ally, demanding adequate behavior, questions asked to any international subject or format, whether diplomatic and political or any public format and level will not have adequacy and weight.

Warlick has clearly hinted, announcing that the sides should not blame each other. This is a transparent hint to the Armenian side, its behavior both before and after April. In the long run, the Armenian side has had its role in maturing and strengthening the Azerbaijani aggression with its inadequate foreign policy and ineffective diplomacy.

When did Azerbaijan start intensifying the ceasefire violations, increasing calibers of weapons, moving on to large-scale actions, including the downing of unarmed Armenian helicopter during a training flight? When Armenia took a u-turn from the association agreement to the Eurasian Union overnight, actually demonstrating to what extent it is subject to Russia’s influence, demonstrating that Russia’s, not Armenia’s interests and security are dominant on the orbit of its interests.

The Armenian establishment, both government and non-government, having performed this u-turn, announced that they did it for the sake of security of Armenia.

Afterwards, however, the challenges to the security of Armenia were increasing, Azerbaijan’s breaches were growing in caliber, aggression increased. At the same time, Armenia was humiliated politically in the EEU, through organizing readings of Aliyev’s letters and supplying weapons worth billions of dollars to Azerbaijan.

Russia has had a fundamental role in the increase of Azerbaijan’s aggression, while the Armenian foreign minister Nalbandyan declared him the only ally. The only ally was supplier N 1 for the enemy that threatened Armenia with a war. This sole ally did not even try to condemn any attempt at Azerbaijan’s aggression.

Over this period the Armenian government and the so-called non-governmental opposition was busy handing the sovereignty of Armenia to Russia; the government did it to keep its positions, and the non-government did it to appear in government through offers of better service to Russia.

The so-called political system of the Armenian government and non-government was busy with clownery for two or three years the tragic consequences of which would be born and the nation would be saved from the disaster of clownery by the soldier and officer of the Armenian armed forces.

Warlick merely hints at the bitter truth that nobody should be accused because a fatal role in all this was played by Armenia’s foreign policy has had absolutely nothing to do with the problems that the Armenian armed forces were facing.

Hence, it is not accidental that during the April war the armed forces were forced to edit the mistakes of the foreign policy at the cost of their lives, as well as deal with foreign policy to secure themselves from the rear.

And when after the April war they speak about drawing lessons from mistakes, one of the most important conclusions is that the foreign policy of Armenia must stem from the logic of problems facing the Armenian armed forces to ensure that the soldiers and officers of the Armenian army, as well as volunteers do not have to pay a high price to correct the mistakes of inadequacy of that policy and not to allow them to end up in a disaster for the state.